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The paper examines the use of choice experiments (CE) to assess the economic value of 
alternative rail noise reduction interventions on the so-called Brennero railway, Italy. 
The novelty of this paper is threefold. To our knowledge, this is the first study on the 
valuation of noise conducted in Italy and it is the first example of CE applied in the field 
of rail noise valuation. Second, we consider not only the economic value assessment of 
noise reduction but also how this reduction is achieved, ranging from policy instruments 
such as barriers or train technology. Third, the paper provides an original contribution in 
the valuation literature since we test formally the econometric robustness of the CE 
estimates under three payment vehicles. In fact, we consider (a) a special regional tax, 
(b) reallocation of financial resource within the provincial budget on the public transport 
sector, and (c) reallocation of financial resource of the provincial budget from the 
administration and entertainment sector. Test results are mixed. Welfare analysis and 
policy implications of valuing rail noise reduction programs using different payment 
vehicles are discussed.  
 
 
Keywords: Choice Experiment, Noise Abatement, Tax, Tax Reallocation, Formal 
Testing, Welfare Analysis 
 
JEL Classification: C0, R41 
 
We are grateful to Roberto Camagni for helpful discussions. This research is supported 
by the Province of Trento. We would like also to thank the team of the Office of 
Statistics in Trento for their expert support in the survey design and execution. Finally, 
Trento Environmental Protection Agency has provided valuable data on noise, acoustic 
maps and elaborations. 
 
[Authors in alphabetical order. The paper will be presented at the 3
rd Congress of 




Address for correspondence: 
 
Paulo A.L.D. Nunes 
Fondazione ENI E.Mattei 
Campo S. Maria Formosa, Castello 5252 
30122 Venice  
Italy 
Phone: + 39 041 2711400 (Secr. 453) 
Fax: +39 041 2711461 
E-mail: paulo.nunes@feem.it   1
 
1.  Introduction 
Since 1998 in Italy rail noise pollution is regulated by an articulated legal act1 that sets day-time and 
night-time limits on receptors, depending on their vulnerability and distance from the railway. 
Residential areas or vulnerable receptors, such as schools and hospitals, have therefore lower limits 
than less vulnerable ones. Reception limits refer to a precise spatial area along the railway, which 
include receptors within 250 meters from the railway. Such area is divided into two portions, the so-
called “Zone A” and “Zone B”, respectively, 100 and 150 meters far from the railroad track, and 
characterised by different receptions limits.  
Almost one decade after the definition of the Italian national noise regulation, the 
implementation of the required noise abatement measures is still largely incomplete, and only very 
recently we have assisted to the rise of a national debate on how to proceed in order to abate rail 
noise below the limits. The Brennero railway, which is  located in the north east of Italy in the 
province of Trento, is the first example in Italy for which noise abatement plans are currently under 
analysis. For this reason, challenging questions and new opportunities to provide policy makers 
with relevant insights on the best option to be developed against rail noise. Important issues here 
concern: how to accelerate the implementation of the noise abatement regulation; how to choose, 
among the range of possible noise reduction measures, those actions able to provide the highest 
level of acoustic efficiency at the lowest collective cost (i.e.: with a look at the advantages and 
disadvantages of each possible action for the whole range of stakeholders involved). 
In this context, the present examines the use of a Choice Experiment (CE) methodology to 
assess the economic value of alternative rail noise reduction policy interventions, and respective 
instruments. The CE survey has been held in Trento in order to assess the marginal WTP for 
different attributes including noise reducetion, aesthetics, environmental and technical attributes 
with respect to alternative railway plans on the so-called Brennero railway. This allows us to study 
in detail the potential sensitivity of a set of factors that were identified in meeting with experts as 
influencing  rail noise mitigation plans, including the level of abatement and respective type of 
intervention, landscape aesthetics,  and the type of financing proposed.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the current situation concerning noise 
mitigation in the EU political context, identifying the potential in using economic valuation 
methods in general and choice experiments in particular for assessing the benefits of noise 
mitigation. Section 3 explores the use of the random utility model formulation so as to study 
respondent’s behavior. In Section 4, we develop survey instrument and describe the in-person 
interviews conducted on a sample of 511 residents exposed to noise pollution in the province of 
Trento, Italy. Section 5 links the selected theoretical model to an empirical exercise, using the CE 
questionnaire and respective economic valuation exercise. Section 6 discusses the range of the 
economic estimates and evaluates these for different payment scenarios. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Background 
2.1 Noise mitigation in the EU political context 
In the general political intention to shift from more polluting modes of transport to more 
environmental-friendly ones, generally, rail transport is assumed environmental friendly. In some 
                                                 
1 In Italy, the overall noise regulation was set in 1995 (LGQ n. 447/1995). The regulation on rail noise is istead more 
recent as it was set in 1998 (DPR n. 459/1998 “Regolamento recante norme di esecuzione dell’articolo 11 della legge 
26 ottobre 1995, in materia di inquinamento acustico ferroviario”).   2
cases, however, railway lines (either old or new) do not get acceptance from the people living close 
to these infrastructures due to concern about unacceptable noise levels, which are often over the 
current cut-off limits set by the international and national legislations. The Green Paper Future 
Noise Policy of November 1996 (Com(96)540) by the European Commission states that the 
“public’s main criticism of rail transport is the excessive noise level”. Excessive level of noise can 
potentially origin both physiological and psychological consequences for people exposed (Miedema 
and Vos, 1998; Passchier-Vermeer and Passchier, 2000; WHO, 2000). According to a recent report 
of the European Commission (CEC, 2003), for instance, the 10 percent of the European population 
is affected by rail noise levels higher that 55 Leq dB(A), which is the standard safety level indicated 
by the World Health Organization. Moreover, the European Commission “Position Paper on the 
European Strategies and Priorities for Railways Noise Abatement” (CEC, 2003) underlines that, in 
order to protect the current population exposed to rail noise pollution, it will be necessary, on 
average, to reach a noise reduction by 10-15 dB(A). 
Therefore, railway noise abatement has acquired an important priority in the European 
environmental policy agenda. Therefore, there is a high potential for the reduction of railway noise 
in Europe, because the technical instruments for the abatement of noise are available (CEC, 2003). 
In the current EU policy panorama, though, the main issue is the economically viable 
implementation of such expensive noise abatement measures and, therefore, the choice of the most 
cost-effective type of possible interventions. A crucial question is, therefore, whether the social 
benefits of reduced noise can justify the high costs of noise mitigation. The implementation of noise 
abatement measures involves in fact a significant financial cost that is associated either to an 
investment in the train technology, including wagons and railway tracks, or to an investment in 
noise barriers (or a combination of both). The effectiveness of the noise abatement will depend on 
the type of policy intervention adopted, i.e. on the type of noise abatement instrument adopted. 
Having an economic estimate of social benefits of reduced noise then might allow us to identify the 
combination of measures providing highest social benefits per euro of costs, i.e. highest benefit-cost 
ratios. In addition, alternative noise mitigation policies will also have different effects in terms of 
landscape-aesthetics and cost, which should also be considered to provide an overall evaluation of 
the goodness of the possible noise abatement alternatives actually available. 
Environmental valuation methods can be employed to estimate the economic value of changes in 
noise levels and, therefore, to provide a decision support for managers and national authorities 
entitled to plan noise abatement measures. Both Stated Preference (SP) and Revealed Preference 
(RP) methods have been used to estimate the economic value of reductions and increases in noise 
levels by mean of the WTP concept. The choice between one of these two approaches need to be 
motivated depending on a careful consideration of both their pros and cons, and the expected result 
in terms of theoretical consistency, methodological and estimation robustness, insights for policy. 
Advantages and disadvantages of RP compared to SP methods are in fact well known and 
appropriate in their application to noise valuation (for a discussion Navrud, 2002). These will be 
reviewed in more detail in the following subsection. 
 
 
2.2 Economic valuation of noise abatement benefits 
So far, the literature on noise has been dominated by the use of RP methods and, in particular, 
Hedonic Price (HP) techniques. The main strength of HP techniques is that they rely on actual 
behaviour in the housing market, where individual preference for noise and other environmental 
characteristics can be observed, though indirectly. A major drawback is that results of HP studies   3
are extremely sensitive to modelling specifications and the condition of the local housing markets 
(see Smith and Huang, 1993; Schipper et al. 1996 for meta-analysis of air quality and airport noise, 
respectively). However, HP techniques are not able to capture non-use values, or non-use welfare 
impacts, that pertain noise level increases or decreases (e.g., reduced enjoyment of desired leisure 
activities, discomfort or inconvenience, anxiety, concern and inconvenience to family members and 
others).2 
On the other hand, relatively few SP valuation studies on noise are available and most of these 
have been conducted over the last 5-10 years , following the trend in the methodological valuation 
literature regarding the increasing use of SP methods for environmental valuation. Navrud (2002), 
who provides an extensive review of the noise valuation literature, argues that the delay of SP 
compared to RP methods for noise valuation can be justified by the general methodological 
difficulty in applying SP methods to noise valuation. In particular, open issues concern the problem 
of constructing a sound survey for valuing noise level reductions. Major methodological research 
challenges are related to: 
1)  the effort to handle within a SP survey the individual perception of noise reduction, which 
requires, on one side, to describe in a scientifically correct and understandable way the 
proposed reduction in noise level, and, on the other, the ability to interpret results according 
to the given noise perception heterogeneity among respondents; 
2)  the need to employ a realistic and fair payment vehicle that makes respondents accept 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) questions (in fact, respondents are likely to protest WTP 
questions since they think it is unfair that they should pay to reduce noise created by others); 
3)  finally, the difficulty in describing the complexity of possible noise mitigation policies 
within SP choice scenarios. 
 
The first issue is of pertinent attention in the available SP literature on noise valuation since most 
existing studies, so far, seem to have given relatively few importance to the formulation of noise 
perception within the stage survey design (Navrud, 2002). As for other environmental and health 
disturbances, individual can perceive and react to the same level of noise exposure with different 
intensity, depending to their sensitivity to noise and starting level of exposure. It is therefore likely 
that perception and reaction to equal noise reduction vary from person to person. In addiction, even 
though we assume individuals with identical noise perception, still there is the problem of 
explaining what a certain noise reduction, say expressed in decibel, would mean to them in terms of 
actual noise feeling and potential health diseases. In the search for a better way to handle individual 
noise perception in SP surveys, previous case studies suggests that it is crucial to advance 
describing noise reductions using, for instance, examples from day-to-day experience and visual or 
audio aids. Generally speaking, improvements in the description of noise and noise reduction levels 
might be reached with an effort to make clear to respondents which is the link between objective 
and subjective ‘measures’ of noise by mean of examples and references to noise experience in daily 
life. 
Among the existing SP studies, the majority refers to noise abatement program described in 
terms of a percentage reduction in noise levels (typically a 50% reduction). Some authors, including 
Saelensminde and Hammer (1994), criticize this approach because most of the times there is no 
                                                 
2 Among RP methods, avoidance costs approach has also been applied to noise, but the applicability of this method is severely 
reduced because only in certain circumstances the results can be interpreted as a proxy of welfare loss.    4
additional effort on checking whether respondents actually understand what this reduction in noise 
would mean to them. More recently, some Contingent Valuation (CV) studies have instead 
provided respondents with more accurate descriptions of the noise reduction in terms that can be 
better understood. Some of these are put forward original approaches in the day researchers link the 
change in noise level to the personal day-to-day noise experience of respondents. Among these, 
Barreiro et al. (2000) describe the noise reduction by referring to the noise levels respondents 
experience at different times at different weekdays (“day time noise would be reduced from the 
working day level to that of a Sunday morning”). Vainio (1995, 2001) use a CV scenario of 
diverting traffic elsewhere or into a tunnel so that “traffic volume can diminish considerably” on the 
street the respondents had pointed out to cause them the most nuisance. Navrud (2000) and Lambert 
et al. (2001) both describe the noise reduction explicitly in term of annoyance3. Lambert et al. 
(2001) use a five-point Likert scale to capture the respondent level of annoyance, but do not provide 
details on the way they specify what various levels of annoyance mean to them. Navrud (2000), 
instead, provides the respondents with a detailed list of avoided impacts in term of discomforts, 
including sleep disturbance. This approach has the advantage that, if respondents are asked about 
their current level of noise annoyance, economic estimates per person annoyed per year for different 
noise annoyance levels can be estimated. Nevertheless, a drawback is that the meaning of 
lower/higher level of annoyance remains subjective, and researchers have to handle a substantial 
rate of uncertainty, whenever trying linking annoyance reduction to decibel reduction. Ideally, this 
problem might be overcome monitoring the actual level of noise exposure at each respondent place 
and, then, asking the respondents their level of annoyance. In this context, the present study 
employs the use of a valuation survey that provides respondents with some examples of noise 
production, and acoustic maps of exposition to rail noise. Finally, in the valuation section, noise 
abatement is both portrayed in terms decibel reduction and its equivalent measure in terms of the 
distance for the source – see first row on Table 2. 
Second, one needs to look for realistic and fair payment vehicles. This will contribute inter alia 
to the minimize a potential low response rate, as often observed among CV studies on noise, e.g. 
(Navrud 1997) and Lambert et al. (2001). Navrud (2002), however, notes correctly that most 
appropriate payment vehicle could differ according to different noise sources and different countries 
with heterogeneous institutional settings, cultures and preferences. For instance, if, on one side, 
respondents can contribute (as car owner) to the current level of road noise and, therefore, be 
willing to pay for a reduction in road traffic noise, on the other side, they are more likely to protest 
payments to reduce, say, aircraft or industrial noise, for which they are not directly responsible. In 
the present paper we use an innovative payment vehicle based on the trading tax schemes as 
originally proposed by Bergstrom et. al (2004) and Darby and Kontoleon (2004) for the contingent 
valuation setting. In this context, the present paper explores formal hypothesis testing and highlights 
welfare implications of valuing and financing public noise abatement programs using both tax and 
tax reallocation schemes. 
Third, it is well known that, in CV surveys researchers have to select only the strictly necessary 
amount of relevant information to be provided to respondents. This level of simplification, in some 
                                                 
3  In this context, the term annoyance is more specifically intended to be associated with disturbance of activities, sleep, 
communication, and to cognitive and emotional response such as anxiety, irritability and nervousness (WHO, 2000). TNO (2000) 
defines noise annoyance as a feeling of resentment, displeasure, discomfort, dissatisfaction or offence when noise interferes with 
someone’s thoughts, feelings or actual activities. Other, more severe effects, such as hearing loss or physiological stress reactions and 
manifest disorders (e.g. increased risk of cardiovascular diseases), are nowadays considered less relevant whenever dealing with 
environmental noise, and, besides, there is still a lack of epidemiological studies able to provide a quantification of the total number 
of persons affected by such problems.   5
cases, jeopardizes the possibility both to provide an exhaustive description of possible alternative 
policies to respondents, and, consequently, to provide a sound analysis of individual preferences. In 
this context, more and more often, Choice Experiments (CE) methodologies can be used either to 
complement or to substitute CV surveys, especially whenever the intent is of providing decision 
makers with insights for the definition of environmental policies and actions. As a matter of fact, 
CE treat the public policy program, such a noise abatement  program, as a bundle of attributes and 
derives the marginal valuation of each attributes separately. It therefore allows providing 
substantially more information about the range of possible alternative noise policies as well as 
reduce the sample size needed compared to CV, and it can reduce the risk of aggregation bias and 
double counting. Since the purpose of the study is less obvious to respondents, a lower incentive to 
strategic bias is also expected – for  a discussion see Wardman and Bristow (2004). On the other 
hand, survey design issues with the CE approach are characterized by a higher complexity due to 
the multiple numbers of attributes that must be presented to respondents and the relative strong 
demand on the econometric methods used to the analysis of the survey data. This valuation method 
will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
 
2.3 Features of choice experiment 
Choice Experiment (CE) is a non-market valuation method that allows to infer people’s preferences 
for a set of alternatives, described by a set of relevant attributes. This technique has been first 
developed in market research and has then been widely applied in several other fields with the 
purpose of analysing choice behaviour, including transportation research, health economics, 
environmental economics, and the economics of cultural heritage (Louviere et al., 2000). 
In a typical CE survey, the researcher presents two or more alternatives to the respondents, and 
asks the respondents to choose the most preferred one. The alternatives are described as bundles of 
factors, known as ‘attributes’, which are expected to influence respondents preferences for the 
proposed alternatives. The alternatives comprised of bundles of attributes are called “profiles”. A 
combination of two or more profile is called “choice set” or “card”. This scheme allows us to 
examine the attributes that influence choices and the relative importance of each attribute, through 
observation of the choice behaviours of the respondents. 
CE, similarly to dichotomous choice contingent valuation methods, which can be considered as 
a special case of CE, presents some attractive features as a technique for evaluation. First, since 
choice behaviour is observed in daily life, typically in the form of shopping, the respondents answer 
the CE questions more easily than other stated preference techniques, such as rating, ranking, and 
pair-wise techniques, which instead do not involve any choice behaviour in decision-making. 
Second, we can use the hypothetical goods or polices as alternatives so that the respondents’ 
preferences for those goods and policies can be analysed. In the present case, for instance, we can 
use different rail noise reduction policies as alternatives. This is a valuable improvement over 
revealed preference method such as hedonic price approach, where the range of noise reduction is 
usually not clearly measurable and irrelevant to policy. In addition, we can calculate the WTP for 
noise decrease based on the preferences of a selected sample, whereas it is the householders’ 
preferences that are usually elicited in the hedonic price approach. Moreover, CE has an attractive 
advantage over CV. A typical noise abatement policy involves various aspects that can have a 
significant impact on people well-being. What type of noise is targeted by the policy? What level of 
noise reduction does the policy grant? When and at which cost will be the policy implemented? CE   6
can separately estimate preferences of individuals for these aspects. On the other hand, CV mainly 
focuses on the valuation of one aspect or one fixed set of aspect. 
Despite these advantages, to our knowledge, CE has not been used so far in the field of the 
economic valuation of rail noise reduction. We therefore try to explore how the CE can be used in 
eliciting people’s WTP for reductions in train noise pollution, and how it can become an important 
analytical tool in the field of value measurement and welfare analysis of alternative public noise 
abatement programs. This exercise will be discussed in detail in Section 4. Before, however, we 
modelling respondent’s behavior, the corner stone for any welfare assessment, will be discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
 
3.  Modeling respondent’s behaviour: theoretical framework  
3.1 Random utility model 
The underlying assumption when assessing the economic valuation of alternative noise abatement 
programs is that monetary value reflects respondent’s behavior. In other words, the economic 
valuation exercise reflects respondents preferences regarding the choice of alternative noise 
reduction programs. Let H represent the set of alternative noise abatement alternatives, and S the set 
of vectors of measured attributes. The choice for an individual respondent can be defined as a draw 
from a multinomial distribution with probabilities:  
Prob() A s x , |      A x∈ ∀   with  A ⊆ H  (1) 
i.e. the probability of selecting noise reduction program x, given the vector of observed attributes s 
and the set of noise pollution abatement practices A, for each and every alternative contained in the 
set A. To operationalize the preceding condition, we establish an individual behavior rule, which 
maps each vector of observed attributes s into selected noise abatement program. In other words, we 
need to set up a respondent’s behavior model. In the present analysis, we opt for a model that is 
anchored in the use of a utility formulation. In this context, let Uij be the utility of the ith noise 
abatement alternative for the jth individual respondent. Furthermore, we assume that each utility 
value can be partitioned into two components: a systematic component, Vij,  and a random 
component, εij. Formally we have: 
ij U = ij V + ij ε   (2) 
In addition, we assume that respondents will choose the alternative that yields the highest 
utility. In other words, the individual j will choose program i if and only if:  
ij U > hj U   A h i ∈ ∀ ,  with  h i ≠   (3) 
Combining equations 2 and 3, we know that a noise abatement program i is chosen if and only if 
( ) ij ij V ε + >( ) hj hj V ε + , or ( ) hj ij V V − >( ) ij hj ε ε −   (4)   7
Since we cannot observe (εhj – εij), we cannot exactly assess if (Vij  – Vhj) > (εhj – εij). Therefore, 
we only can make statements about a choice up to a certain point. In other words, we need to 
calculate the probability that (εhj – εij) will be less than (Vij  – Vhj):  
Prob( ) A s x j ij , |=  P r o b ij = Prob ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) { } [ ] hj ij ij hj x s V x s V x s x s , , , , − < −ε ε A h i ∈ ∀ ,   (5) 
i.e., the probability that a respondent will choose xi,  i  noise abatement program, equals the 
probability that the difference between the random component of the utility function is less than the 
difference between the systematic component of the utility function, across the two noise abatement 
programs under consideration. In other words, we set up a random utility model formulation (see 
McFadden 1974). We do not know the actual distribution of (εhj  –  εij)  across the population. 
However, we assume that this unobserved distribution is related to a particular statistical 
distribution. In order to test the empirical validity of this behavior model formulation, we need to 
select a particular statistical distribution. This will be discussed in the following sub-section.  
 
3.2 Logit choice model 
There are many statistical distributions available, but the one frequently used in random utility 
modeling is the extreme-type I distribution. This is known as the Weibull distribution. With the help 
of this family distribution we will able to translate the unobserved random index (εhj – εij) into a 
probability expression that will help to the understand respondent’s utility (see MacFadden 1984, 
Hanemann 1984). In order to derive such a model formulation, we start with the definition of the 
Weibull distribution in terms of εhs: 
Prob() ε ε ≤ h = exp( ) ε − −exp =
ε e e−    (6) 
In addition from equation 5, which defines the rule for respondent behavior, we have that: 
Probij = Prob( ) ( ) hj ij ij hj V V − < −ε ε      A h i ∈ ∀ ,   (7) 
Rearranging equation 7, dropping the subscript j to avoid over-notation and assuming that Ui ≠ 
Uh, we get: 
Probi = Prob () () h i i h V V − + < ε ε      A h i ∈ ∀ ,   (8) 
Combining equation 6 and equation 8 we get: 
Prob () () h i i h V V − + < ε ε  = exp( ) ε − −exp =
ε e e−   (9) 
that is, the use of a Weibull distribution together with the random utility model allows us to obtain 
empirical choice probabilities with respect to alternative noise abatement programs.  
Nevertheless, it is the use of a strict economic theoretic foundation that allows us to develop a 
simple operational model. We refer to the independence from irrelevant alternatives choice axiom. 
This axiom states that the probability of choosing one clam management practice over another is 
unaffected by the presence (or absence) of any additional alternatives in the choice set. This implies   8
that the random elements in the utility are independent across choice alternatives and identically 
distributed. Therefore, and according to Louviere et al. (2000) the probability of choosing clam 
management i can be written as the product of the H-1 terms, as specified in equation 9, for a given 
value of εi (say b). Formally, we have 
Probi = Prob () ( h i i h V V − + < ε ε ,   ) A h i ∈ ∀ , = exp [] () h i
H
h
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This way the probability of choosing a particular noise abatement program i can be assessed by 
integrating the probability density function, as expressed in equation 10, over all possible values of 
ε , i.e. 
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that defines the basic empirical specification consistent with the random utility model. This is 
referred to in this article as Multinominal Logit (MNL) model (see Louviere et al. 2000 for more 
details). The task is now to proceed with the estimation of the utility parameters as described in 
Equation 13. This task will be discussed in the following sub-section.   9
 
3.3 Estimation of the parameters of consumer’s utility  
The first step refers to the specification of a functional form of the utility expression V(.), i.e. 
specify the relationship between the various attributes and observed respondents choices. In the 
present analysis, we work with a linear, additive form that maps the multidimensional X attribute 
vector into a unidimensional overall V utility (rating). Formally we have: 










ikj ik X β   (14) 
Given estimates of the utility parameters, βs, an estimate of Vij is computed by taking the βs and the 
Xs for individual j and alternative i. Furthermore, according to equation 14 utility parameters may 
vary across respondents because the levels of attribute contained in each alternative vary across the 
J individuals.  
Finally, we need to select a statistical estimation technique. We use the maximum likelihood 
estimation method to estimate the utility parameters of the closed-form MNL model. In formal 
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with  hj d defining a dummy variable such that  1 = hj d  if alternative h is chosen by individual j and 
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(17) 
Where the β s estimates are interpreted as a magnitude of the weight of the each attribute in the 
utility expression. With these parameter estimates we are able to assess the economic impact of 
changing attributes for each and every fish management alternative. This information is crucial in 
estimating the monetary value of each attribute,  and thus in interpreting the decisions on clam 
fishing and associated welfare changes. Furthermore, this theoretical model allows us to compare 
expected utility levels across different fish management practices and thus rank them. In fact, from 
the MNL model formulation the expected utility of a particular alternative i is   10
∑
i
Vi e log      (18) 
Bearing equation 18 in mind, one can express the expected value from an initial management 

















    
(19) 
where WTP (willingness to pay) denotes the economic welfare impact of the management change, 
or income compensating variation, that makes the individual as well off on the original situation as 
he will be under the new management situation. λ is the marginal utility expressed in monetary 
terms, or simply marginal utility of money. In other words, it denotes the change in utility that 
arises from an infinitesimal increase in individual’s income. The marginal utility of money is 
derived from the MNL linear model as the price coefficient estimate. The price, here interpreted as 
a noise abatement-related-attribute such as the una tantum cost of the program (e.g. regional tax), 
has a negative coefficient. This reflects that a higher cost of the noise abatement program results in 
lower utilities. In order to change this into the marginal utility of money we need to multiply this 
price MNL coefficient estimate by –1. 
Now we are in a condition to apply this model to predict consumer choice behavior. We need, 
however, to identify and measure other noise abatement related attributes that together with the 
price characterize the utility function of the respondent. This constitutes an important task in our 
empirical work and it will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
 
4.  The CE valuation exercise on rail noise abatement 
4.1 Statement of the environmental quality management problem 
As mentioned before, the reduction of railway noise reception levels can be achieved by three 
essential types of measure: on the source, including train vehicles and tracks; in the sound 
propagation path; or at the receptor. In the past, the latter type of measure was most common. As 
current practice in Europe, measures such as barriers (with high cost) or sound insulation windows 
(with limited effect) are mostly chosen instead of more cost-effective source-related measures. The 
reason for this is articulated and includes several issues. Firstly, the sound propagation measures 
were normally taken due to noise reception limits which have to be observed locally, whereas 
vehicles are often of broader origin and beyond the influence of the local authorities. Secondly, 
vehicle emission limits, which could enforce measures on the rolling stock, exist only in few 
countries, whereas the application of traditional barriers and sound insulating windows does not 
need much innovation. In addition, the instruments to evaluate the best solutions from a cost-benefit 
point of view and to apportion the contributions of vehicles and tracks and the associated 
responsibilities have been applied only recently in this field. 
In Italy, a decree of the Ministry of the Environment (DMA 29/11/2000), which is consistent 
with what is stated in the more recent “Position Paper on the European Strategies and Priorities for 
Railways Noise Abatement” (CEC, 2002), indicates that preference should be given to noise 
measures at the source (i.e.: either on the vehicles and on the tracks) rather than to barriers and  11
buildings insulation systems. Still, local authorities in charge to define noise actions can operate 
discretionally and need advice to select the strategy that, better than others, can guarantee higher 
benefits for local communities. Even if some technical guidelines are available, the evaluation of 
noise measures needs to take into consideration local territorial conditions and, possibly, the 
preferences of the affected population for alternative policy solutions. 
In the context of this study, settled in the province of Trento, two radical positions are debated. 
On one side, the local Environmental Protection Agency is recommending to intervene along the 
railroad track gradually, with low noise barriers (perhaps still not sufficient to reduce noise below 
the limits) to be combined, during a second phase, with some technological innovation in wagons 
and railroad tracks. This would guarantee, in two steps, the required level of noise reduction, 
minimizing the drawbacks of noise barriers for people living or working in the vicinity of the 
railroad, in terms of aesthetics, landscapes and micro-climate changes (such as lower lighting in 
case of deadening barriers, or green-house effects during summer in case of transparent barriers). 
On the other hand, the Italian railway company (RFI), is strongly recommending actions with high 
barriers and no technological advance that would be able to guarantee immediately the required 
level of noise reduction but with higher collective costs in terms of aesthetic and environmental 
drawbacks. Time of provision and infrastructure costs are expected to be higher in the former case. 
To provide advice to the local authorities on the preferred noise abatement option to maximize 
social utility, a Choice Experiment approached was designed and a survey was distributed on a 
representative sample of the local affected population. Overall, 511 householders were randomly 
selected from the universe of 1400 households exposed to noise level beyond the limits and living 
within the “Zone A” in seven different sites along the Brennero railway. 
 
4.2  Structure of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts. The first part focused on the respondents’ noise 
perception. First, we asked respondents their opinion on the current rail noise situation and asked 
them to talk about their on experience on noise, through a set of eleven questions. First we referred 
to noise in general terms and used six phrases on noise sensitivity to infer the respondents’ noise 
profile. Using a six-point Likert scale, responds are asked to say whether they ‘not at all’ or ‘totally’ 
agree to what stated in each phrase. Second, we asked respondents how many hours they spent 
home during working days and during week-ends to infer  additional information on their level of 
noise exposure. We then focused on rail noise and ask respondents to say whether rail noise 
annoyed them, during day and night time, respectively. If yes, respondents were asked to indicate 
their own level of annoyance using a five-point scale (as recommended by ISO, 2000): ‘not at all’, 
‘slightly’, ‘moderately’, ‘very’, extremely’ annoyed). Those ‘moderately’, ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ 
annoyed were then asked to indicate which type of disturb they suffered, during day and night-time, 
respectively. A special question were used to understand whether the disturbance was due only to 
the rail noise emission or it was also related to the vibrations generated during the transit of trains. 
According to the results of the focus groups held in two of the seven sites surveyed, in fact, 
vibrations are also perceived as an important source of disturbance generated by the vicinity to the 
railway. We also asked whether the level of annoyance declared by the respondents (the 
householders) was either similar to those suffered by the rest of the household components or 
higher or lower, and which type of disturb they suffered. Finally, we asked whether they had never  12
though to move because of the rail noise, and whether they thought they lived in a noisy or quite 
neighbourhood. 
*** Introduce Figure 1 here *** 
The second part introduced the policy choices and prepared the respondents for answering to the 
choice experiment questions. First we informed the respondent about the current level of noise 
pollution at which they are exposed and the previsions on the level of noise pollution due to the 
Brennero railway that will be reach by 2010 according to the local Environmental Protection 
Agency. For instance, the current noise exposure level is approximately 7 to 9 and 9 to 11 decibels 
over the limits during day and night, respectively. We also showed the respondent an acoustic map 
of the site in which he/she lived showing the relation between noise level and distance from the 
railway (Figure 2), in which he/she could identify his/her own place. We explained that noise would 
decrease approximately by 8 to 10 and by 11 to 13 decibel if the distance from his/her own place 
increased, respectively, by 10 and 20 times.  
*** Introduce Figure 2 here *** 
Second, we informed the respondent that the local administration was about to implement some 
noise abatement actions to reduce noise below the limits and we described with simple words the 
main pros and cons of the two alternative types of noise reduction policies that the local 
administration was considering for implementation. One policy option consisted in noise barriers, 
the other one in some technological change either in the train or the railway lines, or both. We 
explained that the maximum noise abatement capacity of noise barriers is approximately 20 
decibels and that it increases as its height and deadening power increase, whereas high and sound 
absorbent barriers can inconvenience residential areas due to aesthetic and environmental 
drawbacks, such as reduced lightening and air circulation. On the other hand, an improvement in 
technology is free from aesthetic and environmental impacts and can also grant a reduction of 
vibrations, but it has a lower noise reduction capacity, up to 5-6 decibels, which would therefore 
require using also some barriers, though narrower in height. Time of provision would be different in 
the two cases but we intentionally did not mention this issue to avoid increasing to much the 
difficulty of the choice exercise. We then showed the respondents several visual simulation of 
barriers with different height (four and eight meters), either with or without aesthetic improvements 
with vegetation. The graphical simulation consisted of a succession of images showing a given site 
(corresponding to the respondent’s site) either without or with the barrier, and either without or with 
vegetation. We also show to the respondents a graph, which we called “noise barometer”, with 
examples of various noise levels that one can experience in day life, and examples of noise 
reductions moving from one situation to another one. Here noise reduction levels in decibels are 
also translated in terms of audible noise and explained in terms of increased distance from the noise 
source and the receptor (Figure 3). The noise barometer was let at the respondent’s disposal during 
the whole CE exercise. 
*** Introduce Figure 3 here *** 
The third part gathered additional information to have a clear image of the respondents’ profile, 
attitudes, socio-economic conditions, exposure to noise, use values provided by the railway and so 
forth. Among the others, we asked the respondents: whether their home was provided with thermal 
and sound insulation systems; whether their home had a garden or a balcony and, if yes, if a noise 
barrier might spoil their recreational value; rooms’ number and exposition on the railway. 
Questionnaire debriefs closed the survey.  13
 
4.3  CE questions 
Preliminary to the CE questions, we clearly explained to the respondents that the implementation of 
the noise reduction policy, which is able to reduce noise below the limits, would have been costly to 
the local administration (approximately 30 to 80 Euros per household for the year 2006) and that it 
would have had to find a way to finance it. We therefore explained that the local administration was 
considering two alternative project financing strategies. Following, Bergstrom et al. (2004), the first 
one consisted in reallocating the public budget for 2006, and transferring on the noise project the 
financial resources usually allocated on some other public service, as described in survey stated, 
without burdening the households with any additional local tax. The second option was to introduce 
a new local tax una tantum for the year 2006, set according to the household income level. 
Following the above explanation, the respondents focused on the CE questions. They were 
instructed to choose their preference between the two survey described profiles. The two survey 
described profiles correspond to two alternative policies. These fifer in the acoustic efficiency 
(noise reduction capacity), type, aesthetic (given by the eight of the barrier), the associated price 
and type of financing. The attributes and the attributes’ levels used in the CE are shown in Table 1.  
*** Introduce Table 1 here *** 
The acoustic efficiency of each profile is described by the level of noise reduction expressed in 
decibel. Three increasing levels of noise reduction are used. The lower one (minus 9 to 11 decibels) 
corresponds to the minimum level of noise reduction able to fulfil the limits set by the Italian noise 
regulation; whereas the higher ones (minus 12 to 14 and minus 14 to 15 decibels) guarantee higher 
levels of acoustic protection. The sign of the coefficient of this attribute is expected to be positive 
since the individual utility increases as the noise abatement increases. 
Two types of noise reduction measures are involved: barriers and technological investment in the 
trains and in the railways. Barriers are described providing the respondents with the eight of the 
barrier, which is expressed in meters and can change on two different levels (either 4 to 6 meters or 
6 to 8 meters). Technological change is described in comparison to the current situation and can 
consist of: 1) an improvement in the train technology, able to reduce aerodynamic noise, traction 
noise and vibrations; 2) an improvement in the in the railway technology, resulting in a reduction of 
rolling noise, traction noise and vibrations; 3) a combination of both. To facilitate the respondents 
in the CE questions, each of such attributes’ levels is accompanied with an indication of the related 
level of noise (and vibration) reduction that explains the overall effectiveness associated to each 
policy profile. 
Price is the financial burden of purchasing the hypothetical good to reduce rail noise, whereas 
the type of financing is the way in which households will pay for it. The expected sign of this 
coefficient is negative, since the utility of individuals decreases as the financial burden increases. 
We prepared all the combinations of the attributes levels, eliminating implausible or inconsistent 
ones. Choice sets consisted of two alternative profiles. The first one is fixed and corresponds to a 
benchmark (i.e. a minimum safety standard) policy that guarantees the minimum level of noise 
reduction able to fulfil the limits (i.e. minus 9 to 11 decibels) using noise barriers (4 to 6 meters 
high) without any improvement in the railway and train technology, nor the presence of vegetation 
in the barrier. The second one varies from card to card and corresponds to a policy that provides 
additional noise reduction levels and a reduction in vibrations too, since it combines the use of noise  14
barriers with improvements of trains’ or railway lines’ technology. All combinations were asked in 
roughly equal frequencies. Each respondent was presented with four questions.  
 
5.  Modelling and valuation results 
5.1 Indirect utility model specifications  
In order to operationalize an empirical formulation of the indirect utility function as described by 
Equation 14, the following six model specifications are examined.4 Model 1 is the simplest model 
that we consider to investigate the effect that each attributes under consideration have on the 
respondents’ preferences, and therefore on the choice of the noise policy. Formally we have 
 
Model 1 
HEIGHT NOISE NOISE NOISE PRICE V × + + + = 2 3 2 4 3 2 1 β β β β  
 
In this model formulation, PRICE refers the cost of the policy to the respondents. NOISE2 and 
NOISE3 denote the variables for the level of noise reduction (minus 12 to 14 and minus 14 to 15, 
respectively). NOISE2 can be reached in two cases: whenever using a combination of high noise 
barriers (6-8 meter) and a low technological investment either on trains or rails; or low noise 
barriers (4-6 meter) and strong technological innovation on both trains and rails. NOISE3, instead, 
is the highest level of noise reduction that can be provided by the local administration only 
whenever using the highest level of barriers and strongest effort in technological innovation. The 
omitted variable is NOISE1 that corresponds to the minimum level of noise reduction able to fulfil 
regulation limits. It comes from the use of low noise barriers without any technological innovation. 
The interaction between NOISE2 and HEIGHT controls for the effect of the height of the barrier 
that we interpret as the most important aesthetic feature of the noise policy. Ceteris paribus, β4 
provides the effect of a unit increment of the barrier’s height on the probability to choose a noise 
policy that reduces noise by 12 to 14 decibel. β1 can be interpreted as the coefficient of the cost of 
the noise policy to the respondents regardless of the type of project financing (i.e. payment 
vehicle).5 
As we mentioned before, we also want to assess the statistical magnitude of the econometric 
impact of the different payment vehicles on the consumer’s choice and therefore the economic 
valuation of alternative noise abatement programs. For this reason, we explore the use of Model 2 
and Model 3, which can be interpreted as two formal testing of the payment vehicle.  
Model 2 considers only the sub-sample with the two tax-reallocation payment vehicle, i.e., all 
the respondents that receive a questionnaire in which the CE questions is either formulated with the 





                                                 
4 Note that all the indexes for the respondents and alternatives have been omitted. 
5 We also explore other model specifications, however, the effect of vegetation on the barriers has not revealed to be 




+ × + + + = HEIGHT NOISE NOISE NOISE PRICE V 2 3 2 4 3 2 1 β β β β  
PVADM PVADM PRICE 6 5 β β + × +  
 PVADM is a dummy variable for the type of payment vehicle. It takes on value ‘zero’ if the 
transfer is on the public transport budget and value ‘1’ if on administration budget. β1 can be 
interpreted as the coefficient of the cost of the noise policy to the respondent given a transfer on the 
public transport budget, whereas β5  is the coefficient of the cost of the noise policy to the 
respondent given a transfer on the administration budget.  
It is therefore interesting to test whether the reported CE responses are influenced by the type of 
tax reallocation, controlling that all the respondents face one of the two proposed tax reallocation 
schemes. This can be formalized with the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Trading taxes effect on reported CE responses   
H1a H1b
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0     : H








In addition, we explore the use of Model 3 so as to test the empirical significance of the trading 
taxes vs. paying taxes effect. For this reason, we now consider all the sample of respondents. On 
one hand we have the sub-sample with all the respondents that receive a questionnaire in which the 
CE questions is either formulated with the use of a tax reallocation within the public transport 
budget or a tax reallocation from the administration. On the other hand we have sub-sample with all 
the respondents that receive a questionnaire in which the CE questions is formulated in terms of a 
new tax.  
 
Model 3 
+ × + + + = HEIGHT NOISE NOISE NOISE PRICE V 2 3 2 4 3 2 1 β β β β
PVTAX PVTAX PRICE 6 5 β β + × +  
PVTAX is a dummy variable that takes on value ‘1’ if the policy will be financed with a new 
local tax, ‘zero’ otherwise. β1 can be interpreted as the cost of the noise policy to the respondent 
given the tax-reallocation scheme, whereas β5 is the coefficient of the cost of the noise policy given 
the introduction of a new local tax 
It is therefore interesting to test whether the reported CE responses are influenced by the type of 
payment schemes, in particular assess whether CE responses confirm contingent valuation data that 
suggest the WTP with a tax reallocation is higher than the WTP with a special tax. This can be 




Hypothesis 2: Trading taxes vs. paying taxes effect on reported CE responses   
H2a H2b
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Finally, we explore Models 4 to 6 so as to investigate the effect of the population 
characteristics on the marginal WTP uniform utility function. In particular, Model 4 incorporates in 
the utility function the respondents’ level of noise exposure and annoyance. It involves the cross 
terms of NOISE2 and EXPOSURE, and PRICE and ANNOYANCE. ANNOYANCE is the level of 
noise annoyance during the day, based on a five-points Likert scale, whereas EXPOSURE is a 
dummy variable that takes on value ‘1’ if the respondent lives in the first row of buildings directly 
exposed to the railway, ‘zero’ otherwise. We can therefore examine the differences in the valuation 




+ × + + + = HEIGHT NOISE NOISE NOISE PRICE V 2 3 2 4 3 2 1 β β β β  
ANNOYANCE PRICE EXPOSURE NOISE × + × + 6 5 2 β β  
 
Model 5 and 6 add income, education level, gender and level of environmental concern in the 
utility function. INCOME is a continuous variable and provides the household monthly income. 
EDUCATION is a categorical variable ranging from ‘zero’ to ‘six’ (degree or PhD). GENDER is a 
dummy that takes on value 1 if the respondent is a male, zero otherwise. ENVIRONMENT takes on 
value 1 if the respondent is concerned about environmental issues, zero otherwise. This allows the 
examination of the effects of the characteristics of individual respondents on the valuation of the 
single attributes. From the coefficients of cross terms we can investigate: whether there is a 
difference in the marginal utility of price due to different annoyance or education levels, and 
whether there are differences in the marginal utility of NOISE2 given the respondent’s income, 
noise exposure and environmental concern, and of NOISE3 given the gender. 
 
Model 5 
+ × + + + = HEIGHT NOISE NOISE NOISE PRICE V 2 3 2 4 3 2 1 β β β β  
+ × + × + ANNOYANCE PRICE EXPOSURE NOISE 6 5 2 β β  
EDUCATION PRICE INCOME NOISE × + × + 8 7 2 β β  
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+ × + + + = HEIGHT NOISE NOISE NOISE PRICE V 2 3 2 4 3 2 1 β β β β
+ × + × + ANNOYANCE PRICE EXPOSURE NOISE 6 5 2 β β
T ENVIRONMEN NOISE
GENDER NOISE EDUCATION PRICE INCOME NOISE
× +









Now we will present the results of the parameters estimates for each of the models and discuss the 
welfare implications and the respective repercussions in terms of policy design. Before, however, 
we will briefly discuss some basic statistics of the questionnaire data. 
 
5.2. Some basic statistics of the questionnaire 
The data were collected through in-person home interviews of 511 randomly sampled households 
affected by rail noise pollution (living in buildings within 100 meter away from the Brennero 
railway infrastructure), which yielded 482 responses. A trained team of 23 experts from the 
Statistics office of the Province of Trento were recruited and carefully instructed for the survey. 
Prior to the survey extensive focus groups and pretest to check the validity of survey instruments 
was carried out in February 2005 for other 50 households. The responses to the focus groups and 
the pretest greatly helped to improve phrases in the questionnaire and develop a more 
understandable explanation of the good evaluated. In particular, information requirements, 
comprehension of noise reduction levels, visual aids, payment vehicle and monetary bids were 
discussed during the focus groups. 
Descriptive statistics on the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are 
summarized in Table 2. The sample significantly represents the universe of households affected by 
rail noise in the province of Trento. We selected samples evenly from households living in 
buildings directly or indirectly exposed toward the railway (i.e. first or second row of building from 
the railway). The average respondent is a 56 years old householder living in the vicinity of the 
railway since more than 20 years. Her/his household consists of about 2 persons, with one 
component younger than twelve in the 16 percent of the cases. The average household income 
(1,742 Euro per month) is little lower than that of Trento population, which is estimated to be 
around 2,400 euro per month. In the 72 percent of cases respondents own the place where they live, 
which usually has a garden or a terrace that is exposed to rail noise. Overall the sample is highly 
sensitive to health and environmental issues and fairly informed on the rail noise issue. In addition, 
survey results indicates that respondents scarcely use the Brennero railway.  
*** Introduce Table 2 here *** 
The survey also contained a set of questions to have a better understanding on: 1) how 
respondents perceived rail noise in comparison to other environmental issues; 2) how much 
sensitive they were to noise in general, and how much they were annoyed by rail noise; 3) whether 
they were also annoyed by vibrations; 4) which type of disturb they suffered; 5) which was their 
level of noise exposure (given distance, orientation, insulation capacity of the building and hours 
spent home). All these factors are expected to affect preferences for noise level reductions. Table 3 
shows the descriptive statistics of noise perception, sensitivity, annoyance and exposure questions. 
*** Introduce Table 3 here ***  18
 
5.3 CE estimation results 
Estimation results for Models 1 to 6 are shown in Table 4. In Model 1 all variables are highly 
statistically significant. As expected the sign of PRICE is negative and that of the level of noise 
reduction is positive. Significant coefficients of the level of NOISE2 and NOISE3 show that the 
valuation of noise reduction varies according to the relative level of provision. Respondents 
displayed the highest preferences for the measures that provide an additional level of noise 
reduction equal to NOISE2 rather than NOISE3, in respect to the minimum granted by the so-called 
benchmark policy (i.e. NOISE1). As shown in Table 5, WTP to NOISE2, a policy noise abatement 
strategy that relies in an investment both on train or tracks together with a noise barrier set at a 
minimum level (at most 6 meters) is highly appreciated by the respondents showing a WTP of about 
230 Euro per household for 2006. However, if one portrays a maximum decibel abatement 
increasing barriers up to 8 meters, then the WTP decreases to a range of 31 Euro per household. 
Confronting this estimate with the coefficient of the interaction between NOISE2 and HEIGHT, 
which is negative and statistically significant, we can understand that that respondents have a strong 
preference for a policy that provides a certain noise abatement thanks to an increase of trains or rails 
technology rather than increasing the height of noise barriers. These results suggest that, as 
expected, the height of the barrier is perceived as a major drawback of the noise policy. We can 
interpret this result as signalling a strong disutility from the powerful negative aesthetic impact of 
such a construction. 
Model 2 provides a test of the effect of different payment vehicles on individual preferences. 
According to Model 2 estimates, the cross term of, PRICE_PVAMD is positive. This signals that 
ceteris paribus the payment of the noise abatement program with the reallocation of taxpayers 
money from the administrative budget, rather than with the reallocation of taxpayers money within 
the transport budget, has a positive in the respondent’s utility and therefore in choosing the 
protection program. Nevertheless, the respective statistical magnitude does not differ from zero. For 
this reason we can not reject the null for H1a. In Model 2 we also consider a direct effect of the 
payment vehicle on the indirect utility, captured by PVAMD. This is positive. This signals that 
ceteris paribus if one proposes the financing of the program via reallocation of taxpayers money 
from the administrative budget has positive effect in the indirect utility, independently of the 
amount of payment. Therefore, it capture a sort of psychological objection towards the reallocation 
of taxpayers money within the transport budget towards the noise abatement (or alternatively a 
psychological content  towards the reallocation of taxpayers money from the administrative budget 
towards per se. As before, the respective statistical magnitude does not differ from zero. For this 
reason we can not reject the null for H1b. Therefore, we can conclude that CE data does not show 
that the two tax reallocation schemes under consideration provide different incentives on 
consumer’s choice behaviour and thus on choosing a noise protection program. 
On the contract, estimation results for Model 3 show that the cross term between PRICE and 
PVTAX is negative and highly statistically significant. This suggests the existence of a negative 
relationship between the introduction of a new local tax and the selection of a noise protection 
program. For this reason we can not reject the null for H2a. This in turn is reflected in the monetary 
valuation of the program. In fact, respondents are more inclined to pay for a noise policy that is 
financed reallocating a quota of the resources normally destined to other public services than for 
one financed with a new local tax – see Table 5. This is an important result that confirms and  19
extends to CE the results presented by Bergstrom et al. (2004) in the case of a CV study to assess 
ground water protection policy in Georgia and Maine. 
In Model 4, both the effect of the cross terms with EXPOSURE and ANNOYANCE are positive 
and highly statistically significant, meaning that individual utility is sensitive to the individual level 
of noise exposure and annoyance in the expected way. The higher the respondents’ baseline level of 
noise exposure and annoyance, the higher is their WTP for noise abatement. 
Finally, in Model 5, N2_INCOME is positive and significant though the coefficient is narrow in 
absolute value. This suggests the existence of a positive relationship between the choice of a noise 
protection program, and income, as expected. Similarly, P_EDUCATION is positive and 




6.  Welfare analysis and policy discussions 
Standard economic theory suggests that the WTP should be positively associated with the 
magnitude of risk reduction. Even though this study is not directly concerned with risk, we can 
expect that, similarly, the WTP should increase as the level of provision of noise abatement 
increases. Results from Model 1 and 2 tell us that an additional level of noise reduction, higher than 
NOISE1, is welcomed by respondents as coefficients of NOISE2 and NOISE3 are both positive and 
statistically significant. However, if we calculate the WTP associated to NOISE2 and NOISE3, we 
see that the marginal utility of moving from a noise abatement by -10 to -12 decibels is higher that 
the marginal utility of moving from -10 to -14 decibels – see Table 5. Apparently this is a 
misleading result. We tentatively understand that this is due to the disutility associated to an 
increase in the height of the barrier, which for NOISE3 is at its maximum level. HEIGHT_N2 is 
negative and statistically significant showing that the utility attached to NOISE2 and NOISE3 is 
related to the corresponding level of technological innovation rather than to the barrier. HEIGHT is 
perceived as a severe source of aesthetic impoverishment, which is central to debates over the type 
of rail noise abatement measures to be preferred in Italy and Europe. All the rest fixed, the effect of 
a unit increment of the barrier’s height on the probability to choose a policy is negative and priced 
at a range of minus 30 Euro per household for 2006.  
Results from Model 3 provide an original contribution for improving the acceptance and 
realism of the payment vehicle. Model 3 tells us that the acceptance of a payment vehicle based on 
an indirect payment in the form of a tax-reallocation scheme is higher than that for a conventional 
tax scheme. The coefficient of PVTAX_P is in fact negative and statistically significant, resulting in 
a lower evaluation of those noise policies financed via the introduction of a new local tax by 37 
percent – see Table 5. As in Bergstrom et al. (2004) in the field of ground water protection policies, 
the empirical results of our case study indicate that people in our sample were willing to pay more 
for noise reduction using a tax reallocation financing mechanism as compared to a special tax 
financing mechanism. In addition to Bergstrom et al. (2004), whose CV study does not specify the 
bundle of public services to be traded off for environmental goods, in our survey we used caution to 
describe them to the respondents and referred to two types of public services: public administration 
and public transport. The former and the latter one being perceived by the residents of the Province 
of Trento, respectively, as relatively important and very much important.  
The coefficient for EXPOSURE_N2 and ANNOYANCE_P in Model 4 suggest that the 
individual pattern of noise perception is likely to influence the WTP for noise abatement in a 
predictable way. Individuals with a stronger perception of noise, which can derive from exposition 
to higher decibel levels or higher sensitivity to noise (resulting in higher annoyance) are more prone  20
to pay to purchase noise abatement. This is an appealing result that confirms the importance of 
knowing as accurately as possible the respondents’ profile according to noise perception, and of 
improving the methods for gathering such information. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
We developed a framework for the valuation of several relevant features of rail noise policies using 
a CE approach. This approach allows us to understand the preferences of people exposed to rail 
noise for alternative noise abatement measures, which are expected to differ according to their 
acoustic efficiency, aesthetic, level of technical innovation and type of project financing. 
The signs of major estimated coefficients are statistically significant and consistent with the 
theoretical predictions, including that respondents evaluate price increase negatively, while 
evaluating noise abatement positively. In addition, estimation results show that respondents strongly 
prefer a noise policy that relies on technological innovation rather than barriers. In particular the 
height of the noise barrier is perceived as a cost priced at about 30 Euro per household per unit 
increase. 
In addition, we explore forma hypothesis testing so as to infer if and how the type of financing 
mechanism explains different level of willingness to pay for alternative noise reduction policies. In 
our sample people were willing to pay more for noise reduction using a tax reallocation financing 
mechanism rather than a special tax financing mechanism. Moreover, our empirical results suggest 
that the bundle of public services to be traded off for environmental goods needs to be specified as 
WTP varies according to it. We found that respondents were more willing to pay for noise policies 
financed by drawing resources from the budget normally used for public administration as 
compared to policies financed using a quota of resources usually allocated on public transport. 
Furthermore, we proceed with the econometric analysis of the population characteristics on the 
reported CE responses and thus on the valuation of the noise abatement program. Estimated results 
suggest that it is good practice to check for the valuation transmission mechanism caused by the 
individual noise exposure and annoyance.  
Finally, and to conclude, estimation results show that if no policy action is undertaken so as to 
make additional investments in the train or railroad, and thus able to reduce aerodynamic noise, 
traction noise and vibrations, a significant welfare loss may result. An estimate of the total welfare 
loss ranges from 218,400 to 322,000 Euro. This value is obtained by: (1) assuming that the 
respondents that participated in the survey are representative for the entire population that live in 
the 100 meters strip along the Brennero railway; and (2) multiplying the sum of the noise abatement 
benefits, which is derived from the CE model and ranges from 156€ to 230€ by the total number of 
residents in that same strip line in the Brennero region, estimated at 1,400. However, the probability 
that a noise abatement project would be welfare improving for the community according to CBA or 
potential Pareto improvement criterion will depend positively on the premise that (a) the project 
was financed by a reallocation in public budget, (b) project would involve strong investment in the 
train and railway technology, and (c) respondents present a high sensitivity to noise exposure and 
annoyance.  
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    Table 1. List of the attributes used in the CE value application 
 
1.  Reduction of noise level and disturbance [decibel]:  
-  Minus 9-11 decibel  
[As if the distance between your place and the railway would increase 10 times (e.g. from 100 
meter to 1 kilometre)] 
-  Minus 12-14 decibel  
[As if the distance between your place and the railway would increase 20 times (e.g. from 100 
meter to 2 kilometre)] 
-  Minus 14-15 decibel  
[As if the distance between your place and the railway would increase 30 times (e.g. from 100 
meter to 3 kilometre)] 
  
2.  Height of noise barrier:  
-  4 to 6 meters 
-  6 to 8 meters 
3.  Height of noise barrier:  
-  4 to 6 meters 
-  6 to 8 meters 
4.  Barrier:  
-  With vegetation 
-  Without vegetation 
5.  Price of the program (Euro/household/year2006):  
-  35 euro 
-  37.5 euro 
-  45 euro 
-  55 euro  
-  60 euro 
-  65 and 70 euro 
 
6.  Type of financing:  
-  Reduction of 2006 provincial budget on public transport, without any additional tax 
-  Reduction of 2006 provincial budget on administration and entertainment expenses, without 
any additional tax. 
-  New provincial tax una tantum for the year 2006, without any reduction of provincial budget.      
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for socio-demographic characteristics. 
  Mean or percentage 
Age 56.3 
Over sixty-five  31%  
Female 49% 
Household size  2.39  
Has child below 12 years of age  16% 
Years of schooling (>13)  51% 
Since when lives in the vicinity of the railway (years)  23.00  
Owns the place where she/he lives  72% 
Has garden or terrace  84% 
Cares about health issues  98% 
Cares about environmental issues  94% 
Fairly, very much or extremely informed on rail noise before the survey  77% 
Uses the Brennero railway for work  7% 
Uses the Brennero railway for tourism or other than work  38% 
Household monthly income (Euro)  1742.5  
  24
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of noise sensitivity scores, noise perception annoyance and exposure questions. 
  Mean or percentage 
  Noise sensitivity   
If I should buy or rent a house, I would avoid the proximity to busy streets, 
nightclubs or restaurants  5.48  
Some times noise makes me nervous  4.12  
If noisy while studying or working I shut the door or move in another room   4.70  
  Rail noise perception   
Rail noise is ‘more’ or ‘equally’ important than traffic noise  72% 
Rail noise is ‘more’ or ‘equally’ important than air pollution  47% 
Rail noise is ‘more’ or ‘equally’ important than biodiversity depletion  71% 
Rail noise is ‘more’ or ‘equally’ important that electromagnetic pollution   65% 
  Rail noise annoyance   
Annoyed by noise during the day  85% 
‘Very much’ or ‘extremely’ annoyed during the day  42% 
Annoyed by noise during the night  74% 
‘Very much’ or ‘extremely’ annoyed during the night  50% 
Did think to move because of rail noise  25% 
Disturbed by rail noise when using garden or terrace  65% 
Can not rest quietly during the day  15% 
Weak up easily during the night  39% 
Gets nervous  14% 
Can talk with relatives or listen to radio and TVs  56% 
  Noise and vibrations   
Only noise disturbs me  25% 
Only vibrations disturb me  1% 
Noise and vibrations disturbs me equally  29% 
Both noise and vibrations disturb me, but more noise than vibrations  31% 
Both noise and vibrations disturb me, but more vibrations than noise  14% 
  Noise exposure   
Building with direct exposition on the railway  53% 
Hours spent home during the week  6.7  
Hours spent home during the week-end  8.2  
Thermal or sound insulation systems installed  93% 
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients (Model 1 - Model 6). 
  Model 1  Model 2

























































P_PVADM   0.0004 
(0.012) 
    
PVADM   0.134 
(0.626) 
    
P_PVTAX    -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
   






















N3_GENDER       0.164 
(0.244) 
N2_ENVIRONMENT       0.114 
(0.312) 
SAMPLE  1905 1432 1905 1615 1614 1610 
Notes: Significance is indicated by ***, ** and * for the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively, with standard error in 
parentheses. 
a Model 2 considers the sample of questions with a tax-reallocation payment vehicle, either on public transport or 
administration budget. 
EXPOSURE_N2, INCOME_N2, ENVIRONMENT_N2 are cross terms with NOISE2. GENDER_N3, PVADM_P, 




Table 5: Willingness to pay estimates (Model 1- Model 3). 
WTP  Model 1  Model 2
a  Model 2
b  Model 3
c 
 (pooled)  Administration  Public  transport  Tax 
NOISE2 156  230  223  139 
NOISE3 33  31  30  28 
HEIGHT_N2 -20  -30  -29 -18 
 
Notes: Willingness-to-pay is expressed in Euro per household for the year 2006. 
a WTP estimates from Model 2 given a tax reallocation on the budget for administration and entertainment expenses. 
b WTP estimates from Model 2 given a tax reallocation on the budget for public transport. 





  Do you ear the train?   Does the rail noise disturb you? 
 
 
Yes     
No     
Not at all     
Slightly     
Moderately     
Very much     
Extremely     
 





















Figure 3: Noise barometer with examples of noise levels pertaining to different day life situations and examples of 
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